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Ditta: Leading the Way in Unconstitutional Delegations of Legislative Po

NOTE
LEADING THE WAY IN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DELEGATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE POWER:
STATUTORY INCORPORATION OF THE LEED
RATING SYSTEM
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Green building"' was "[o]nce considered to be a part of the Left
Coast fringe, along with hot tubs and macram6," but this perception has
changed dramatically in the minds of the American people. 2 The green
building movement has roots in the 1970s, when there was a major push
to find innovative ways to collectively consume less oil due to the
dramatic increase in prices. 3 Today, green building is becoming, if it is
not already, part of the mainstream construction industry.4 Enthusiasm

1. "Green building" is a term of art that couples environmentally-sustainable construction
practices with environmentally-conscious building design. See Christopher P. Perzan, What You
Should Know About Green Building, CBA REC., Nov. 2006, at 38, 39 ("Green design ... seeks to
maximize energy efficiency, minimize resource use and waste production, reduce or eliminate toxic
materials in building components, and reduce the overall impact of the building on the
environment."). There is, however, much controversy involved with defining green building and no
set or accepted definition has become universal. See Jennifer Bowmar & Laurie Wireman, Hopping
on the Green Wagon. How Corporations Can Overcome Potential Political and Legal Pitfalls
Associated with Sustainable Initiatives, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1479, 1489 (2008).
2. Patricia Leigh Brown, It HappenedHere First,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2005, at F l; see also
Lisa Chamberlain, Serving Architects, Consultants in Everything Green Become Mainstays, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2008, at C6 ("'Going green used to be part of just a handful of organizations'
mission statements, but now it's become part of everyone's agenda. . . .' (quoting Ashley Katz,
Communications Director for the Green Building Council)); William Neuman, It's Getting Easierto
Be Green, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, at JI ("If faced with the choice of renting or buying two
similar apartments .. . consumers increasingly will opt for one with green features, even if it comes
at a higher price."); Robin Pogrebin, Putting Environmentalism on the Urban Map, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 2006, at 7 ("The green building movement is catching on in pockets nationwide.").
3. See Green Building: Basic Information, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
greenbuilding/pubs/about.htm#4 (last updated Feb. 16, 2010).
4. See Marc Erpenbeck & Colleen Schiman, The Past, Present, and Future of Green
Building, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2009, at 33, 63 (discussing the possibility of green
building becoming standard construction practice).
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for green building is not concentrated solely in United States,5 but has
similarly spread around the globe.6 Green building is becoming
increasingly common in the construction industry,7 and the trend is
predicted to continue well into the future.8
The green building trend has resulted in lawmaking bodies
delegating legislative power to the U.S. Green Building Council
("USGBC").9 The USGBC has become a de facto lawmaker through the
incorporation of the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
("LEED") rating system in statutes, ordinances, and executive orders. o
This is a largely overlooked subversion of our democratic process; the
dispersal of lawmaking authority creates a serious lack of accountability
to the public, which ultimately amounts to an unconstitutional delegation
by our legislatures."
Legislation continues to be adopted at the state and local levels that
mandates compliance with the LEED rating system.12 The USGBC
proudly advertises that governmental bodies across the country are
adopting the LEED rating system as their rule and guide for defining
green buildings.13 The legislation at issue requires buildings to abide by
LEED standards to different degrees,14 but all such green building
legislation incorporating LEED standards requires some extent of

5. See Rodney Taylor & Howard Tollin, Presentand FutureRisks of the Green Construction
Movement: Addressing Risks in the Design, Construction and Operation of Green Buildings, N.Y.
ENVTL. LAW., Summer 2009, at 21, 21-22 (describing how various groups-such as commercial
building owners, corporations, state and municipal governments, private construction firms, and
workers of all ages-have developed an interest in green building due to its perceived benefits).
6. The green building industry is growing to varying degrees around the world and there are
sharp contrasts between green building practices in North America and Europe as compared with
those in Asian nations such as China and India. See id. at 21.
7. Erpenbeck & Schiman, supra note 4, at 33.
8. Taylor & Tollin, supranote 5, at 21.
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra Part III.B.
12. See Patricia E. Salkin, New York Climate Change Report Card: Improvement Neededfor
More Effective Leadership and Overall Coordinationwith Local Government, 80 U. COLO. L. REV.
921, 938 (2009) (describing the LEED rating system as the "most popular rating system" for green
building); Edna Sussman, Reshaping Municipal and County Laws to Foster Green Building, Energy
Efficiency, and Renewable Energy, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11-12 (2008) (describing how Boston,
Massachusetts, Washington, D.C., and Babylon, New York adopted the LEED rating system via
statute).
13. See LEED Rating Systems, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/
DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPagelD=222 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
14. See Salkin, supra note 12, at 939 ("The ordinances also differ in their exact requirements,
for example, whether actual certification by the [USGBC] is necessary, which level of LEED
criteria must be sought, or whether waivers are available.").
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compliance with criteria set by USGBC and our elected
representatives. 15
The American people should be assured that lawmaking power will
be retained in our legislative bodies by the court-made nondelegation
doctrine, the crux of which is political accountability. 16 Congress, our
nation's legislature, is constitutionally permitted to delegate authority to
federal agencies, and it has been doing so since the founding of our
nation.17 Past delegations have been to the concordant branches and
agencies that are carrying out the will of Congress and thereby the will
of the people.18 However, when too much authority is dispersed by a
legislature, the decision-making process and lawmaking function are no
longer accountable to the public through their elected legislators.1 9
The privatization of government functions does not always result in
a serious divergence from our constitutional principles. 20 Green building
legislation can have a promising future with the assistance of the
USGBC. There are advantages to having the USGBC develop the
technology and standards for a more environmentally-sound built
environment, including the cost of research and development being
borne by the private rather than public sector. 21 The courts will
15. See, e.g., id. at 939-41 (describing a variety of green building ordinances, all of which
incorporate the LEED rating system).
16. See Thomas R. McCarthy & Richard W. Roberts, Jr., American Trucking Associations v.
Environmental Protection Agency: In Search and In Support of a Strong Nondelegation Doctrine,
23 WHITrIER L. REv. 137, 178-79 (2001) ("[T]he [nondelegation] doctrine promotes accountability
and better social policy, because it requires that Congress be the decision makers to the extent
possible."); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 335-36
(1999) ("[T]he [nondelegation] doctrine is designed to promote a distinctive kind of
accountability-the kind of accountability that comes from requiring specific decisions from a
deliberative body reflecting the views of representatives from various states of the union."); Robert
Theuerkauf, Note, An Effort to Revive the Nondelegation Doctrine:D.C. Court ofAppeals Makes a
Fundamental Mistake and Sets Back Congress and the EnvironmentalProtection Agency's Efforts
to Further Protect Human Welfare, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 869, 873 (2001) ("A democratic government
stands for the idea of 'accountable decisionmaking.').
17. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 330-32.
18. See Theuerkauf, supra note 16, at 873.
19. See id. ("One scholar noted that '[w]hen Congress legislates policy, its decisionmaking is
constrained by the political process. But when Congress delegates its legislative power, it attenuates
this constraint."' (quoting Michael Ezra Fine, Note, Rethinking the Nondelegation Doctrine, 62
B.U. L. REV. 257, 258 (1982))).
20. See Shirley L. Mays, Privatization of Municipal Services: A Contagion in the Body
Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 41, 44 (1995) ("It is now well-settled that cities are free to contract with
private entities for the performance of governmental services.").
21. The USGBC uses its LEED committees and green building experts to assess the
implementation of green technology as incorporated in the LEED rating system, thereby bearing the
costs of research and development. See LEED Technical Committee, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL,
http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPagelD=1792 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011); infra notes
246-47 and accompanying text (discussing how using the LEED standard could shift costs onto the
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ultimately have to rule on the future of the USGBC's role in setting the
standards for green building legislation.22
Part II of this Note discusses the background of green building and
its growing role in America's public and political landscapes. In
particular, Part II examines the USGBC organization in greater detail
and its LEED green building rating system. This Part also examines
specific examples of the LEED rating system implemented in statutory
form. Part III.A provides an overview of the nondelegation doctrine, its
history and application. Part III.B applies the nondelegation doctrine to
laws incorporating the LEED rating system and highlights some
particularly troubling instances of unconstitutional delegations of
lawmaking power to the USGBC through the incorporation of the LEED
system. Part IV discusses possible benefits and potential drawbacks
intrinsic in the privatization of green building regulations; it then goes
on to suggest possible solutions for this serious constitutional issue. Part
V concludes by emphasizing that our democratic system of government
not only allows for, but actively encourages, political discourse and
debate; discussion is especially warranted when it comes to the
momentous and contentious environmental movement as applied to the
growing green building trend in America.
RIDING THE WAVE OF GROWING AWARENESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL
CONCERNS: GREEN BUILDING, THE USGBC, AND THE LEED RATING
SYSTEM

II.

Green building is becoming a driving force in the development and
construction industries due to increased political support 2 3 and a
growing awareness that the American general public is composed of
consumers who are more alert to environmental concerns than ever
before. 24 More and more attention has been focused on the environment
since the birth of the environmental movement in the 1960s.25 With the
USGBC); cf E. S. Savas, Privatizationand Prisons,40 VAND. L. REV. 889, 894 (1987) (stating that
"cost savings" was one of the top reasons why public officials contract for services).
22. See infra Part III.B (arguing that the USGBC has been delegated an unconstitutional level
of legislative power).
23. See, e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records Ass'n, The Greening of the White House, ADMIN.'S
CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAM, http://clinton3.nara.gov/Initiatives/Climate/greeningsummary.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (describing President Bill Clinton's "Greening of the White House
Initiative").
24. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 2 ("Many architects ... are now embracing green designs
because their clients are demanding it.").
25. See Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives to Promote Sustainable Construction
and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More State Land Use Policy
Incentives, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 731, 742 (2008).
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global construction boom,26 awareness dramatically increased 27
regarding the substantial impacts of conventional construction.28 This
has resulted in federal agencies showing greater concern for, and more
seriously considering, the substantial impacts that our built environment
has on climate change. 29 This Part lays out the history of the green
building movement, the USGBC, and the LEED rating system, and
exhibits some instances of how influential the USGBC has become in
defining the green building movement through the adoption of LEED
standards in law.
A. The Green Building Movement GarnersPoliticaland Popular
Support
At the heart of its idealistic definitions,30 green building is
primarily concerned with decreasing the environmental impacts of
construction and reducing the long-term environmental consequences of
the built environment.31 Initially, the cost of building green may be
higher than that of conventional construction,3 2 but the actual price
increase is often less than typically expected.3 3 Building owners have
learned that green building is not only good for the environment, but

26. See Taylor & Tollin, supranote 5, at 21 (discussing how building stock is likely to double
by 2030 in China).
27. See Brown, supra note 2 (describing how the "culture" of architecture has changed to
embrace green building).
28. See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use
Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REv. 231, 243 (2008) (describing some of the impacts of
conventional construction).
29. See, e.g., Green Building: Frequent Questions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/greenbuilding/pubs/faqs.htm#l (last updated Dec. 22, 2010) ("Reducing the
energy use and greenhouse gas emissions produced by buildings is therefore fundamental to the
effort to slow the pace of global climate change.").
30. See Bowmar & Wireman, supra note 1, at 1489 (stating that green building is "not
universally or consistently defined").
31. See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, BUILDING MOMENTUM: NATIONAL TRENDS AND
available at
GREEN BUILDINGS 4-5 (2003),
HIGH-PERFORMANCE
PROSPECTS FOR

http://www.usgbc.org/Docs/Resources/043003_hpgbwhitepaper.pdf (describing green building);
Keith H. Hirokawa, At Home With Nature: Early Reflections on G7reen Building Laws and the
Transformation of the Built Environment, 39 ENVTL. L. 507, 514 (2009) (offering a definition for
the term "green building"); see also Taylor & Tollin, supra note 5, at 21 (describing green building
and how green buildings are different from conventional buildings).
32.

See GREG KATS ET AL., THE COSTS AND FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF GREEN BUILDINGS 15

(2003), available at http://www.usgbc.org/Docs/News/News477.pdf ("[O]n average, the premium
for green buildings is about 2%.").
33. See Bowmar & Wireman, supra note 1, at 1484 ("[I]n reality, the premium cost is
unlikely to be cost prohibitive. In fact an extensive study assessing for newly constructed green
buildings in California found that the up-front construction cost averaged less than 2% above
traditional construction of similar buildings.").
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more importantly for them, that it is good for building business' bottom
line; in just one year, the increased costs associated with green building
can be offset by the decrease in the building's operational costs. 3 4
The attentiveness of the general public to the benefits of working35
and living in greener, healthier environments has assisted in spurring the
growth of green building.36 Developers and building owners are
responding to the public's desires and, more so now, its expectations of a
greener built environment.3 7 Building owners recognize the health and
financial incentives of building green. 39 The building industry
acknowledges that there are many positive externalities associated with
green buildings, including an improved reputation with the public and
fewer conflicts with environmental groups. 40 Further, businesses benefit
when they take environmentally-conscious action because it allows them
to stay ahead of the curve of governmentally-imposed environmental
regulations.4 1
The current trend towards developers making the choice to
construct green buildings also sprang from the insight that there are
substantial environmental impacts associated with conventional
construction techniques.42 The seriousness of the considerable
34. See id. at 1490-91 ("The upfront costs of constructing ... a facility with green features
may require an initial investment .. .. But the decreased costs of operating a facility infused with
energy-efficient features can offset the upfront construction costs in as little as one year.").
35. See Taylor & Tollin, supra note 5, at 22 ("Workers of all ages ... expressed a strong
preference for working in green buildings . . . .").
36. See Matthew J. Parlow, Greenwashed?: Developers, Environmental Consciousness, and
the Case ofPlaya Vista, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 513, 521-22 (2008) (describing how changing
values with regarding environmental issues has pushed the development of green building).
37. See Taylor & Tollin, supra note 5, at 22 (discussing media and public awareness of the
health benefits of green buildings, and how that has influenced certain corporations to adopt green
building practices); Dana Mattioli, How Going Green Draws Talent, Cuts Costs, WALL ST. J., Nov.
13, 2007, at B10 (describing how companies have been adopting green policies in an attempt to
attract talent and to cut costs).
38. See Taylor & Tollin, supra note 5, at 22 (discussing how workers in green buildings have
fewer medical problems and generally miss fewer days of work when looked at in comparison to
workers in conventional buildings).
39. Research has shown that green buildings can lead to increased productivity and decreases
in medical problems for workers when compared with conventional buildings. See Parlow, supra
note 36, at 522 (discussing the growing market for green buildings and the noted benefits to worker
productivity and decreased absenteeism); see also Taylor & Tollin, supra note 5, at 22 (discussing
potential financial benefits of green building for private construction).
40. See Bowmar & Wireman, supra note 1, at 1487.
41. See id.
42. See Bronin, supra note 28, at 243-45 (discussing the widespread environmental impacts
and costs of conventional construction in contrast with possible alternatives); John L. Sznopek &
William M. Brown, Materials Flow and Sustainability, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (June 1998),
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-0068-98/fs-0068-98.pdf ("Since 1900, use of construction materials such
as crushed stone and sand and gravel has increased from about [thirty-five] percent to [sixty]
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environmental costs is compounded by the fact that construction is "the
nation's largest manufacturing activity."a Conventional construction
uses an extensive amount of natural resources during the building
process,44 and debris from construction projects in America amounts to a
staggering 136 million tons per year.45 Of this astounding figure, only
about twenty to thirty percent of the debris is actually recovered for
recycling.4 6 These statistics are difficult to visualize and comprehend
when looking at them on paper, but they should not be taken lightly
when substantial environmental benefits can be realized by simply
building green.47
The long-term benefits of owning and operating a green building
are both reputational and financial,48 and have helped to foster the
movement's continued growth. 4 9 The benefits of green buildings include
a decreased cost of building operation,so increased productivity of
workers, 5 ' and the maximization of economic and environmental
performance. 5 2 In contrast, conventional buildings have a greater longterm environmental impact and a less efficient operational ability,
ultimately resulting in overall higher costs. 53 Building owners
understand all of these potential advantages linked with building green,
particularly because green building can improve profitability by
reducing operating costs 54 that have been historically associated with
building ownership.5 5

percent of total non-food, non-fuel raw materials consumption in the United States.").
43. Bronin, supra note 28, at 243.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 244.
46. Buildings and Their Impact on the Environment: A Statistical Study, U.S. ENvTL. PROT.
AGENCY, 6 (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/greenbuilding/pubs/gbstats.pdf.
47. See Bronin, supra note 28, at 243-45 (discussing the environmental benefits of green
building).
48. See id. at 245-46 (describing potential financial benefits of green building); Taylor &
Tollin, supra note 5, at 22 (describing various reputational benefits of green building).
49. See Bowmar & Wireman, supra note 1, at 1489 (arguing that the various environmental,
reputational, financial benefits "provide incentives" to engage in green building).
50. Green Building: Why Build Green?, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
greenbuilding/pubs/whybuild.htm (last updated Dec. 2, 2010).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Bowmar & Wireman, supra note 1, at 1489 (listing "reduced lifetime operational
costs" as an incentive for adopting green building policies); Bronin, supra note 28, at 244-45
(arguing that LEED certified buildings consume "substantially less water and energy" than
conventional buildings, which translates into decreased operational costs).
54. See Green Building: Why Build Green?, supra note 50.
55. See Bronin, supra note 28, at 244-45 (describing the economic and environmental costs of
running conventionally designed buildiigs after they are constructed).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3

376

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:369

Building owners have not been the only group to take notice of the
benefits of building green. Major political attention was first directed
toward the green building movement during the Clinton
Administration. In 1993, President Bill Clinton began promoting the
benefits connected with green buildings in his "Greening of the White
House" initiative.57 The second annual "Greening of the White House"
report identified considerable financial incentives that could be achieved
by incorporating environmentally-conscious features into the White
House and retrofitting existing elements of the building. It was
predictable that a green building program at this level of government had
the potential to significantly influence awareness to the environmental
movement.59 As such, the report was centered on the direct
environmental benefits that would result from converting the White
House into a "world-class environmental showcase," and on the
inspiration that this environmentally-cognizant program would give to
the American public.60
President Clinton may have been one of the first major political
proponents of green building, 6 1 but the Oval Office's enthusiasm has not
diminished with the passing of time.62 President George W. Bush
evidenced his support for green building by requiring federal agencies to
comply with environmental standards set out in an executive order.63
Today, the political endorsement of green building continues under
President Obama's administration.64 President Obama's stimulus
package contained multiple incentives to encourage the use of
environmentally-conscious building features and designs.65 The
56. See Erpenbeck & Schiman, supra note 4, at 33.
57. See id.; Nat'l Archives & Records Ass'n, supra note 23 ("President Clinton announced
the Greening of the White House Initiative on Earth Day 1993.").
58. See Nat'l Archives & Records Ass'n, supra note 23 ("The Second Annual
Report ... estimated savings of more than $150,000 per year in energy and water costs, landscaping
expenses, and expenditures associated with solid waste. White House Greening measures .. . are
saving an additional $150,000 each year, for a total of approximately $300,000 annually.").
59. See id. ("Hopefully this report will provide you with the ideas and inspiration to make
your home, office, or business more energy efficient, environmentally sound, and comfortable.").
60. Id.
61. See Erpenbeck & Schiman, supra note 4, at 33 (describing President Clinton as an early
supporter of green building).
62. See id at 63 ("[W]ith the current presidential administration and its plans for the future, it
seems as though green building is not a short-term fad.").
63. Specifically, President Bush ordered that all new construction and major renovations
conducted by federal agencies comply with green building standards, and that fifteen percent of
existing federal buildings incorporate sustainable elements by 2015. See Strengthening Federal
Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management, Exec. Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg.
3919 (Jan. 24, 2007).
64. See Erpenbeck & Schiman, supra note 4, at 63.
65. See id.
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longevity of political support will continue to foster the green building
industry and is likely to aid in increasing the amount and scope of green
building regulations when the real estate market rebounds.66
Along with political endorsements, the general public has embraced
green building. 67 The public has not just voiced its approval with empty
promises, but many people have also been willing to open their
pocketbooks to support going green. Americans seem more prepared and
possibly even eager to assume the costs associated with going green.
The growth in public support may be one of the central factors critical to
explaining the predictions that show the green building market, for both
products and services, was projected to total $60 billion annually by

2010.69
B. The USGBC Has Been a Driving Force in Green Building
The USGBC has been a major source of momentum in the
promotion and development of green buildings; so much so, that it has
largely defined what it means to build green for both the private and
public sectors. 70 The USGBC is a nonprofit organization based in
Washington, D.C. 71 that is "working to make green buildings available
to everyone within a generation." 72 The USGBC seeks to promote and
standardize green building73 and has been responsible for defining-for
developers and for the public-which buildings will be classified as
green under its LEED rating system.74

66. See id. ("When the economy begins to rebound, and building starts anew, the emergence
of more mandatory green-building regulations may grow exponentially.").
67. See Parlow, supra note 36, at 521-22 ("In many cities .. .environmental consciousness
has become a community value .... Moreover, as environmental consciousness grows in many
communities, so does the market for greener homes."); Brown, supra note 2 (discussing how "more
than 9,000 people" attended a recent green building exposition in Atlanta).
68. See Pogrebin,supra note 2 (discussing the likelihood of the American public demanding a
shift towards more environmentally-conscious building designs).
69. About USGBC, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?
CMSPagelD=124 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
70. See id (describing the USGBC's various programs).
71. Id.
72. U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
73. Perzan, supranote 1, at 39.
74. See Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability and Land Use Planning:Greening State and Local
Land Use Plans and Regulations to Address Climate Change Challenges and Preserve Resources
for Future Generations, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 121, 155 (2009) ("The most
commonly used system for measuring building sustainability is the Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design rating system, commonly referred to as LEED."); Sussman, supra note 12, at
10 ("The [USGBC] has emerged as the leader and has been central to the progress of the green
building movement in the United States.").
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The USGBC is made up of various types of members, including
contractors, builders, building product manufacturers, the federal
government, state governments, and local governments, among others.
To become a member of the USGBC, a company or organization must
submit a membership application and pay annual dues, in addition to
paying any other fees assessed by the board of directors. Currently,
there are over 18,000 companies that are members of the USGBC,77 and
the number has been steadily increasing, and the trend is likely to
continue.

One of the USGBC's most noted accomplishments is the
development of the LEED standards that are the most recognizable green
building rating system in the United States, furthering the widespread
influence of the organization in the green building industry. 79 The
USGBC sets the criteria for determining which buildings will be labeled
as green under the LEED system.80 The USGBC has also assumed the
responsibility of educating the public and professionals on the subject of
green building.8 1 Through these efforts and the organization's public
outreach, the USGBC hopes to bring more environmentally-conscious
and cost effective buildings to the American landscape. 82 Having
introduced the USGBC and its functions, the next Part will go on to
examine the details of the LEED green building rating system.

75. See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL BYLAWS art. 3, § 1 (2009) [hereinafter USGBC
(dividing
member
http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentlD=4875
BYLAWS],
organizations into various "membership groups" which are used for organizational purposes).
76. Id.; Chamberlain,supra note 2 ("Membership ranges from $300 for small businesses to
$12,500 for billion-dollar corporations.").
77. About USGBC, supranote 69.
78. See Chamberlain, supra note 2 ("Since its founding, the [USGBC] has grown to more
than 16,700 member companies and organizations.").
79. See Perzan, supra note 1, at 39; About USGBC, supra note 69.
80. See About USGBC, supra note 69 ("The LEED green building certification system is the
preeminent program for rating the design, construction and operation of green buildings.").
81. Id ("USGBC provides top quality educational programs on green design, construction,
and operations for professionals from all sectors of the building industry.").
82. Id. ("[The USGBC is] committed to a prosperous and sustainable future for a nation
through cost-effective and energy-saving green buildings.").
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The USGBC's LEED Green Building Rating System

The USGBC's LEED rating system is a third-party evaluation of a
building's environmental performance.83 The system is designed to
allow an independent third-party to evaluate the implementation of
LEED standards in the construction of a building.84 Some argue that this
type of third-party rating system imposes accountability on developers
who call their buildings green.
In addition to being internationally recognized, 86 LEED has
become the "nationally accepted benchmark" 87 for buildings aspiring to
label and advertise themselves as green. Earning a LEED certification
rating enables a building to advertise as being devoted to an
environmentally-sustainable future. 8 9 The environmental gains realized
by complying with the LEED standards are joined with the prospects of
an increasingly profitable building. 90 One of the advantages of LEED
certification is that nearly all LEED certified buildings incorporate
recycled building materials into their construction and provide recycling
facilities for the buildings' occupants when construction is completed. 91
The USGBC developed LEED standards for homes, commercial
interiors, core and shell, 92 new construction, schools, healthcare
83. See Perzan, supra note 1, at 39 ("The USGBC also functions as an independent, third
party, certification body."); LEED Rating Systems, supra note 13 ("LEED is a third-party
certification program ... for the design, construction, and operation of high-performance green
buildings.").
84. See Building Certification, GREEN BLDG. CERTIFICATION INST., http://www.gbci.org/
main-nav/building-certification/leed-certification.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
85. Neuman, supra note 2 ("Anybody can call a building green, so to impose some
accountability, the [USGBC] created a rating system called LEED ... to measure the degree to
which buildings incorporate green practices and materials.").
86. See Intro-What LEED Is, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/
DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPagelD=1988 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) ("LEED is an internationally
recognizedgreen building certification system. . . ." (emphasis added)).
87. LEED Rating Systems, supranote 13; see also Charles J. Kibert, Policy Instrumentsfor a
Sustainable Built Environment, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 379, 385-86 (2002) ("The U.S.
Department of Energy has been a major supporter of the development and implementation of the
LEED Standard."); Mireya Navarro, Rating Group Gets Stricter on Buildings' Energy Use, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2009, at A8 ("LEED certification [is] the country's most recognized seal of
approval for green buildings.").
88. See Bowmar & Wireman, supra note 1, at 1490 ("By attaining LEED certification on its
buildings, a corporation earns the ability to publicize its devotion to operating its facilities according
to a nationally recognized and objective set of green standards."); Chamberlain, supra note 2
("[A]pproval from the [USGBC] through its LEED certification program [is] the undisputed calling
card of environmental bragging rights.").
89. See Bowmar & Wireman, supra note 1, at 1490.
90. Id. at 1491.
91. Bronin, supra note 28, at 243.
92. "Core and shell covers base building elements such as structure, envelope and the
[heating, ventilation, air condition] system." LEED for Core & Shell, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL,

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3

380

HOFSTRA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 39:369

facilities, retail sites, and neighborhood development. 93 LEED provides
guidelines with which a building must comply in order to obtain a LEED
certification rating.9 4 The rating of a building is dependent upon the
amount and types of green features incorporated into the building's
design; through the inclusion of environmentally-friendly features
approved by the LEED system, a building earns points toward a desired
LEED certification rating.95 LEED standards set forth features a
building can include so that it can attain the title of being labeled as a
LEED certified, silver, gold, or platinum building, depending on how
many points are awarded for the features' inclusion. 96 The LEED system
analyzes how environmentally-friendly a building is according to criteria
defined under the following categories: Sustainable Sites, Water
Efficiency, Energy and Atmosphere, Materials and Resources, Indoor
Environmental Quality, Locations and Linkages, Awareness and
Education, Innovation in Design, and Regional Priority. 97 The LEED
system uses a 110-point scale to calculate a building's environmentallyconscious features according to the aforementioned categories; the
incorporation of such features will determine the structure's ultimate
LEED certification rating by the points awarded at the end of the
project.98
The LEED rating system, however, is no longer administered by
the USGBC. The USGBC has delegated the power to manage the LEED
certification process to the Green Building Certification Institute
("GBCI").99 In order to become a LEED certified building, a developer
must comply with LEED standards. 00 The GBCI will ultimately certify
http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=295 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
93. See LEED Rating Systems, supra note 13.
94. See Erpenbeck & Schiman, supra note 4, at 33 (describing the basic requirements of the
LEED rating system).
95. Id.
96. See Perzan, supra note 1, at 39 ("There are four different levels of certification based on
the number of points awarded: certified, silver, gold and platinum."); Neuman, supra note 2 ("To
receive a LEED rating, completed buildings must be evaluated, and points are awarded for their
green features."); FAQ: LEED for New Construction, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL,
http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentlD=3352 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (explaining the
point breakdown for the various LEED certification levels).
97. See Salkin, supra note 74, at 156; Intro-What LEED Measures, U.S. GREEN BLDG.
COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPagelD=1989 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
98. See How to Achieve Certification, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/
DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPagelD=1991 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) ("LEED points are awarded on a
100-point scale, and credits are weighted to reflect their potential environmental impacts.
Additionally, 10 bonus credits are available, four of which address regionally specific
environmental issues. A project must satisfy all prerequisites and earn a minimum number of points
to be certified.").
99. Id.
100. See Bowmar & Wireman, supra note 1, at 1490 ("Companies serious about incorporating
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whether the building complies with the guidelines set forth under the
LEED system, and thus the GBCI determines if the building has
acquired enough points to attain its desired certification rating. 01 It
should also be noted that solely incorporating LEED's environmental
features is not enough to be considered green under the LEED system;
building owners must pay an up-front registration fee in order to have
their project certified by the GBCI. 10 2
Not all those in favor of green building have embraced the LEED
system. Critics of LEED have pointed out that the system does not
account for some important factors that influence the environmental
impact of a building, such as a building's location.10 3 Further, some
allege that certain products and features have been specified to attain
points under LEED. 104 As such, critics argue that there is an aspect of
"gamesmanship" in being awarded certain points under LEED. 0 5
Additionally, the long-term sustainability of LEED certified buildings
has come under questioning by critics who believe that the system is
shortsighted. 106
The criticism has not stopped the LEED committees of the USGBC
from determining the LEED standards that will apply to each
corresponding building application.' 07 LEED committees have the task
of "improv[ing] and implement[ing] ... LEED rating systems."10 The

purposes of each of the LEED committees are distinct; for example, the
Steering Committee determines the general direction and policy of the
LEED standards, 109 while the Rating System Committee develops the
green elements into their new or existing facilities may seek LEED certification from the [USGBC]
for those facilities.").
101. In 2009, the Green Building Certification Institute was given the task of certifying
buildings under the LEED rating system. See About GBCI, GREEN BLDG. CERTIFICATION INST.,
http://www.gbci.org/org-nav/about-gbci/about-gbci.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
102.

GREEN BLDG. CERTIFICATION INST., LEED CERTIFICATION POLICY MANUAL

9-10

(2011), available at https://www.leedonline.com/irj/go/km/docs/documents/usgbc/leed/config/
the project
(explaining
terms/LeedCertificationManual/LEEDCertificationPolicyManual.pdf
registration process). Owners seeking LEED certification must also pay a "certification fee," which
is calculated based on the size of the project and the rating system that it is being certified under
when they submit their project paperwork for review. Id. at 84.
103. See Charles J. Kibert & Kevin Grosskopf, Envisioning Next-Generation Green Buildings,
23 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 145, 150 (2007); Salkin, supra note 74, at 157.
104. See Kibert & Grosskopf, supra note 103, at 150.
105. Id.
106. See Salkin, supra note 74, at 158 ("[S]ome critics believe that LEED's green building
standards simply do not go far enough in requiring building sustainability.").
107. See LEED Committees, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/Display
Page.aspx?CMSPagelD= 1750 (last visited Mar. 1,2011).
108. Id.
109. See LEED Steering Committee, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/
DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPagelD=1636 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) ("The LEED Steering Committee
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actual LEED rating system criteria and the points awarded for
compliance.o10 In general, the USGBC committees work to update and
implement changes to the LEED certification requirements."'
The LEED committees are made up of volunteer members of the
building and construction industries.11 2 While openings on the LEED
committees are advertised on the USGBC website, membership is
limited strictly to those who are "regular employees of USGBC member
organizations.""' 3 Once the LEED committees develop standards for a
particular building application, they are then approved by the USGBC
membership.I1 4 Having explored the basics of the LEED rating system,
the next Part of this Note will examine various attempts to implement
the aforementioned LEED standards into law.
D. LEED Becomes Law
A prime example of green building legislation is the adoption of the
LEED rating system by statute in Connecticut. 115 According to the
Connecticut statute, the construction of new state facilities with
projected costs of more than $5 million, renovations to state facilities
that will cost in excess of $2 million, new construction of buildings
which cost $5 million or more and which receive $2 million or more in
state funding, and renovation of public schools costing more than $2
million fall within the realm of the statute." 6 These buildings all must
comply with the LEED silver standard (or its equivalent) for the specific
project type. "17

[is] ... charged with developing and maintaining LEED as a leadership tool, preserving the
integrity of the LEED rating system, and ensuring the use of the consensus process to evolve LEED
in accordance with the mission, guiding principles, and strategic plan of USGBC.").
110. See LEED Rating System Committees, U.S.
GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL,
http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=1786 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
111. See Salkin, supranote 74, at 156; LEED Committees, supra note 107.
112. See LEED Committees, supra note 107; LEED Rating Systems, supra note 13 ("LEED
rating systems are developed through an open, consensus-based process led by LEED committees.
Each volunteer committee is composed of a diverse group of practitioners and experts representing
a cross-section of the building and construction industry.").
113. How to Participate in USGBC Committees and Working Groups, U.S. GREEN BLDG.
COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPagelD=1749 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
114. See LEED Rating System Committees, supra note 110 ("The LEED Rating System
Committees have primary responsibility for the development and implementation of LEED credits
for a specific building type or market sector. Once a pilot program has been completed and the
rating system has been approved by USGBC membership, the committee is disbanded.").
115. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-38k(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010).
116. See id.
117. See id.
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Similarly, the New York legislature has also statutorily adopted
LEED, although in an indirect fashion.s18 The New York legislature
enacted laws incorporating the LEED system' 19 that have tax
consequences and other implications for developers. Specifically, the
New York Tax Law allows buildings complying with LEED-inspired
green building standards to receive tax credits. 120
Other examples of adoption of LEED standards have occurred on a
local level. Again in New York, but this time in New York City,
buildings costing the city $2 million or more must comply with, at a
minimum, the LEED silver rating.121 Scottsdale, Arizona has
implemented a similar initiative, but instead requires all new "occupied"
city buildings to comply with the more rigorous LEED gold rating.122
Green building policy has come from the federal, state, and local
levels with few checks placed on the dispersed power.1 23 Because the
green building movement is relatively new and the regulations are
constantly evolving, there has been admittedly little time for criticism or
review of green building regulations. 124 As the public awareness of, and
118. See N.Y. TAx LAW § 19(e)(3)(A) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2010) (requiring that the
New York Department of Environmental Conservation's ("DEC") new regulations be "informed by
the LEED rating system").
119. Id; see also Erpenbeck & Schiman, supranote 4, at 35 (discussing how former Governor
George Pataki's Executive Order No. 111 mandates "any new state construction and/or substantial
renovations [to] employ LEED guidelines as practicable").
120. See N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 19(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)-(7), (e)(3)(A) (stating that a taxpayer whose
building meets specified requirements "shall be allowed a green building credit" against the taxes
on that building, explaining the components of that tax credit, and requiring the DEC to adopt
LEED-based standards).
121. See N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW No. 86, §2 (2005), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dob/downloads/
pdf/ll_86of2005.pdf (amending the New York City Charter to require that new construction and
major renovations of city funded buildings costing $2 million or more to the city treasury "be
designed and constructed to comply with green building standards not less stringent than the
standards prescribed for buildings designed in accordance with the LEED green building rating
system to achieve a LEED silver or higher rating").
122. SCOTTSDALE, ARIZ. RES. No. 6644, § 2 (2005), http://www.scottsdaleaz.gov/Assets/
Public+Website/greenbuilding/Resolution+6644.pdf; see also Erpenbeck & Schiman, supra note 4,
at 34 ("In the public sector, Scottsdale's standards for new city buildings and renovations were the
first to adopt a LEED Gold requirement."); Press Release, Anthony Floyd, Scottsdale City Council,
Scottsdale Becomes First City in the Nation to Adopt Gold Standard for Energy and Environment
Design (Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.scottsdaleaz.gov/greenbuilding/leed ("On March 22, 2005,
Scottsdale City Council unanimously approved Resolution No. 6644 establishing the Green
Building (LEED) Policy for new city buildings and remodels. This action makes Scottsdale the first
city in the nation to adopt a LEED Gold policy.").
123. Cf Kibert, supra note 87, at 385-86 (discussing the efforts by the federal and local
governments to implement green building policies in the United States).
124. See Carl J. Circo, Should Owners and Developers of Low-Performance Buildings Pay
Impact or Mitigation Fees to Finance Green Building Incentive Programs and Other Sustainable
Development Initiatives?,34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 55, 61 (2009) ("Governmental
green building programs are still in an experimental stage... .New programs and features appear
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enthusiasm for, green buildings continues to grow, we can only expect
more governmentally-mandated green building laws. 12 5 As the next part
of this Note will discuss, the fervor surrounding the green building
movement has left many of the usual safeguards of democratic
accountability behind, resulting in an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the USGBC through the incorporation of the LEED
rating system in law. 2 6
III. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION TO
STATUTES INCORPORATING THE LEED GREEN BUILDING RATING
SYSTEM
The green building movement has jumpstarted a nationwide trend
of imposing mandatory green building requirements. 127 The
implementation of green building legislation may be in the early stages
of development, but there are already government regulations and
mandates coming from varying levels of government.12 8 The enacted
green building laws range from simply requiring that publicity be drawn
to the benefits of green building, to the creation of agencies to provide
technical assistance to developers who wish or are required to build
green.129 With this in mind, Part III.A will examine the constitutional
underpinnings of the nondelegation doctrine and how courts have
applied the doctrine in the past. Part III.B will then apply the
nondelegation doctrine to laws incorporating the LEED rating system.
A. An Examinationof the NondelegationDoctrine
There is an underlying presumption130 that legislatures may not use
their lawmaking authority as a channel to delegate legislative power to
other bodies or branches of government.13 ' The presumption has
regularly, and most of the programs ... continue to evolve." (footnote omitted)).
125. See Perzan, supranote 1, at 43.
126. See infra Part II.B.
127. See Erpenbeck & Schiman, supra note 4, at 34.
128. See Bronin, supra note 28, at 255 ("[A] handful of localities currently promote green
building .... They do so by issuing mandates, writing optional codes, comprehensively reevaluating certain existing laws, and granting green-building projects certain procedural benefits.");
Circo, supra note 124, at 61 (explaining how green building programs are still in the "experimental
stage").
129. See Circo,supra note 124, at 62-63.
130. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 606-07 (1992) (discussing
the "presumption" against excessive delegations of legislative power under Article 1).
131. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692
(1892); see also Gary J. Greco, Note, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation
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constitutional underpinnings, 13 2 which have in turn resulted in the courtmade nondelegation doctrine.13 3 The Constitution limits the powers
granted to the government by the people and, therefore, a legislature
must have some constitutional basis for shifting its lawmaking authority
to another branch or body in order to stay within the bounds of

constitutionality. 134
The premise of the separation of powers embedded in our
constitutional system135 makes the nondelegation doctrine an essential
element to ensuring that the lawmaking organs of government are
operating within the constraints imposed by the Constitution.1 3 6
Similarly, the nondelegation doctrine is a way for the courts to aid in
promoting accountability in our democratic society.' 3 7 The principle that
our elected legislators control our nation's lawmaking functions has

Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 570 (1994) ("Under a traditional non-delegation
theory, the legislature cannot delegate any of its lawmaking power to another branch of
government." (footnote omitted)).
132. See Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election:A StructuralExaminationof
the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1376 (1996).
133. See Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1991); see also Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 130, at 606-07 (discussing the constitutional underpinnings of the nondelegation
doctrine, and how the doctrine has developed into "a canon of statutory interpretation rather
than . .. an enforceable constitutional doctrine").
134. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and OriginalMeaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 337 (2002)
("[T]he correct constitutional question with respect to delegation is not, 'Does any clause of the
Constitution expressly or implicitly forbid the delegation of legislative authority?' The correct
question is, 'Does any clause of the Constitution expressly or implicitly permit the delegation of
legislative authority?"').
135. See Springer v. Phil. Is., 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928) (explaining how separation of
powers is "implicit" from the structure of the Constitution).
136. See Touby, 500 U.S. at 165 ("'The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of
separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government."' (quoting Mistretta, 488
U.S. at 371)); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-72 (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine is essential to
ensuring the integrity of the government); Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court's Avoidance of
the Nondelegatiom Doctrine in Clinton v. City of New York: More Than "A Dime's Worth of
Diference," 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 337, 341 (2000) ("The doctrine of nondelegation of legislative
authority is merely one manifestation of the constitutional separation of powers."); Theuerkauf,
supra note 16, at 873 ("The nondelegation doctrine is entrenched in the separation of powers
principle that accompanies our tripartite form of government."); see also Greco, supra note 131, at
569 ("The separation of powers doctrine confers exclusive powers upon each of the three branches
of government. The doctrine of checks and balances requires the legislature to impose limits on the
executive agency charged with carrying out any delegation of lawmaking power." (footnote
omitted)).
137. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 336 ("[T]he nondelegation doctrine should be
associated ... with the ... goal of ensuring ... not only accountability but also reflectiveness. The
vesting of lawmaking power in Congress is designed to ensure . .. that government power cannot be
brought to bear on individuals unless diverse representatives . . . have managed to agree on the
details.").
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been a critical lynchpin of our governmental structure since the nation's
founding. 138
The Constitution sets forth the framework for the allocation of
power within our government. Article I, Section 1 states: "All legislative
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."' 39 The
Necessary and Proper Clause extends Congress's legislative authority by
allowing it "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution" the powers enumerated in the Constitution.14 0
Taken together, these clauses empower Congress to take legislative
action and to assign the power to execute the law, but they implicitly
forbid Congress from conferring discretion upon other bodies the
authority to determine what the law should be.14 1 The central facet of the
nondelegation doctrine is that the power to make the law belongs in the
hands of the elected representatives in the legislature. 142
The Supreme Court and the high courts of several states have
reaffirmed the premise that there are limits on a legislature's ability to
138. See David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle that Elected Legislators Should Make
the Laws, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL. 239, 240 (2003) ("[T]he Framers adopted a Constitution that
barred any new tax unless a majority of the representatives in a directly elected legislature
personally took responsibility for it. This Constitution required legislators to take responsibility not
only for tax laws, but all other laws regulating the people...."); Greco, supra note 131, at 570
("The [F]ramers adopted the [nondelegation] doctrine to avoid the exercise of arbitrary power by
any one branch of government."). But see Sunstein, supra note 16, at 331 (arguing that the
"standard view" of the nondelegation doctrine as a "core part of the original constitution" is
inconsistent with the text of the Constitution, as well as early congressional and Supreme Court
practice).
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; cf CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("The legislative power of this State is
vested in the California Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly. . . ."); CONN.
CONST. art. III, § I ("The legislative power of this state shall be vested in two distinct houses or
branches; the one to be styled the senate, the other the house of representatives, and both together
the general assembly."); N.Y. CONST. art. Ill, § I ("The legislative power of this state shall be
vested in the senate and assembly."); WASH. CONST. art. II, § I ("The legislative authority of the
state of Washington shall be vested in the legislature, consisting of a senate and house of
representatives, which shall be called the legislature of the state of Washington .....
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 18.
141. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) (stating that just because Article 1,
Section 1 vests lawmaking power solely with Congress "does not mean . .. that only Congress can
make a rule of prospective force"); Amar, supra note 132, at 1360-61 (discussing Congressional
delegation of power in relation to the Necessary and Proper Clause); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 331
(arguing that Article I, Section 1 stands for the proposition that Congress cannot delegate its
legislative duties "even if Congress and the public want to do so"). But see Thomas W. Merrill,
Rethinking Article 1, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
2097, 2104-05 (2004) (arguing that using Article 1, Section I as the textual basis for the
nondelegation doctrine is not supported by the text or history of the constitution, and that such
"textual basis" arguments for the nondelegation doctrine have "done nothing to secure its
enforcement").
142. Loving, 517 U.S. at 758.
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delegate the authority to make law.14 3 For example, the Supreme Court
in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United StateSl 44 held that
"Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the
essential legislative functions with which it is . .. vested."l45 This is
particularly the case where trade organizations are involved in the
regulatory scheme and have been delegated the ability to make law:
But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its
legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as
to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and
beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or
industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be
constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such
associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their
enterprises? And, could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a
preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in section 1 of
title I? The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is
unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional
prerogatives and duties of Congress.t46
On the federal level, Congress cannot give a "'blank check' to another
body to make law, especially when the power is concentrated in the
hands of an interest group.147 More generally, Congress cannot abdicate
its lawmaking power, vested in it by the Constitution, because the

143. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556 (1975) ("This Court has recognized
limits on the authority of Congress to delegate its legislative power." (citing Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935))); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
529-30 (1935) (stating that Congress is not allowed to delegate it's lawmaking duties, and that the
necessity of certain delegations of power "cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the
authority to delegate"); see also Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1354 (N.Y. 1987) (stating
that the power to make law shall not be delegated, but that power may be granted to administrative
agencies in the execution of laws); Levine v. Whalen, 349 N.E.2d 820, 822 (N.Y. 1976) (same);
State v. Gilroy, 221 P.2d 549, 552 (Wash. 1950) ("[R]egulation by delegation of authority is subject
to the limitation that the law providing for the delegation must also prescribe an accompanying rule
of action or lay down a guide or standard whereby the exercise of discretion may be measured.").
But see Amar, supra note 132, at 1361 (discussing how the Supreme Court has not struck down
congressional delegations since 1935). See generally Greco, supra note 131 (discussing the federal
and state applications of the nondelegation doctrines).
144. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
145. Id. at 529; see also Packer Collegiate Inst. v. Univ. of N.Y., 81 N.E.2d 80, 82 (N.Y. 1948)
("The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied the power of Congress to delegate its lawmaking
function, while permitting it to delegate the power to determine the existence of the facts which
make the law applicable or inapplicable, and to fill in the details of regulation."). But see Wayman
v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) ("But Congress may certainly delegate to others,
powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself").
146. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537.
147. Sunstein, supra note 16, at 331.
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several states surrendered that power through ratification of the
Constitution. 148
However, as with other doctrines, there are always exceptions:
executives and governmental agencies can, within the bounds of the
Constitution, be delegated certain and specific powers when executing
the legislature's will.14 9 When a legislature delegates power, there must
be reasonable restraints placed upon the authority dispensed.o50 The test
put forth by the Supreme Court is whether Congress has set forth an
"intelligible principle" with which the concordant branch or
governmental agency must comply.15'
Furthermore, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,152 the Court discussed both explicit and implicit
delegations to governmental agencies in the context of its discussion on
reviewing agency interpretations of statutes they administer.153 The
Court stated that when Congress promulgates standards by statute to be
interpreted and applied by an administrative agency, the agency's
interpretation should be upheld as long as it is reasonable and Congress
has not otherwise spoken on the matter.15 4 This decision was based on
148. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 207, 209 (1824) ("Congress cannot enable a
state to legislate .... ); Amar, supra note 132, at 1365 (stating that Gibbons stands for the
proposition that "Congress could not enable States to legislate when the Constitution disabled them
from doing so").
149. See City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 332 N.E.2d 290, 293 (N.Y. 1975) ("[T]here is no
constitutional prohibition against the legislative delegation of power, with reasonable safeguards
and standards, to an agency or commission established to administer an enactment.").
150. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1935) ("'In creating... an
administrative agency the legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power,
must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in the performance of
its function."' (quoting Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 59 (1922))).
151. See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress
shall lay down by legislative act an intelligibleprincipleto which the person or body . .. is directed
to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." (emphasis
added)); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) ("Congress must 'lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is
directed to conform."' (quoting J. W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409)); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 426 (1944) ("Only if we could say that there is an absence of standards for guidance of the
Administrator's action .. . would we be justified in overriding its choice of means for effecting its
declared purpose .... ); David M. Driesen, Loose Canons. Statutory Constructions and the New
Nondelegation Doctrine, 64 U. PIrr. L. REv. 1, 14 (2002) (describing how the intelligible principle
doctrine relates to the nondelegation doctrine); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 1721, 1726-27 (2002) ("A delegation of legislative
power ... is commonly said to occur when the statutory grant of authority lacks an 'intelligible
principle' that provides a sufficient degree of direction in the exercise of statutory authority.").
152. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
153. Id. at 842-44.
154. See id. at 843-44 ("If Congress .. . explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill ... [s]uch
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. [If| the . . . delegation . . . is implicit ... a court may not substitute
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the Court's history of deferring to an agency's statutory interpretation
due to its supposed expertise in the field being regulated.155
The Supreme Court's interpretation of delegations of legislative
authority can be analogized with similar state court constitutional
interpretations of delegations by state legislatures. 156 Such a parallel
relationship stems from the federal and state constitutions'
similarities.1 57 On the state level, legislatures are restricted from
delegating their powers to lesser bodies of government.'5 8 The general
principle guiding delegations of legislative authority at the state level is
a showing that the legislation imposes "adequate standards ... to
channel the exercise of that power."159 State courts, however, are less
likely to uphold legislative delegations than the Supreme Court. 60
Another similarity between the federal and state constitutions is the
limitation on legislative delegations when power is reserved for, or
vested to, lower levels of government.' 6 1 At the state level this is
evidenced by "Home Rule" provisions.16 2 "Home Rule" provisions vest
authority in a local level of government, such as a city, and permits the
municipality to exert lawmaking authority while restricting that of the

its own construction . .. for a reasonable interpretation . . . of an agency.").

155. See id at 844-45.
156. Compare A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-38 (1935)
(stating that Congress may not delegate constitutional lawmaking functions), with Trs. of Saratoga
Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 83 N.E. 693, 699 (N.Y. 1908) (stating the
"principle" that a legislature may not delegate legislative powers).
157. Compare U.S. CONST. art. 1, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."),
with N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The legislative power of this state shall be vested in the senate and
assembly."). See also Antonin Scalia, How Democracy Swept the World, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7,
1999, at A24 ("And to a greater or lesser degree, the same lawmaking inefficiencies [attributable to
the Constitution] are built into the constitutions of the states . . . .").
158. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879) (stating that the powers remaining
with the state government under the Constitution cannot be delegated away to agencies over which
the state has no control).
159. Suffolk Cnty. Builders Ass'n v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 389 N.E.2d 133, 136 (N.Y. 1979) (citing
Levine v. Whalen, 349 N.E.2d 820, 822 (N.Y. 1976)).
160. See Greco, supra note 131, at 578 ("The state supreme courts historically have used the
delegation doctrine to a greater extent than the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down legislative
delegations of power. Traditionally, while the federal government almost always has found broad
delegations constitutional, the state courts have upheld broad delegations of power more
reluctantly." (footnote omitted)).
161. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."), with N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (laying out the powers of "local governments" and how
those powers relate to those of the state legislature).
162. Mooney v. Cohen, 4 N.E.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. 1936).
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state in limited areas, such as land use or other realms deemed to be
strictly local affairs.1 63
These intricacies all come within the legal framework of a
nondelegation analysis, whether it is in relation to an act of Congress,
that of a state legislature, or even an ordinance promulgated by a local
legislative body.'1' At every level of government, the nondelegation
doctrine requires a determination of whether a legislative act has simply
delegated the power to execute law, which is permissible, or if an act
delegates the power to actually determine what the law is, which is

unconstitutional.16 5
For example, in Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy, Inc. v.
Cuomo,1 6 6 the New York Court of Appeals had to determine whether the
legislature could constitutionally delegate the authority to shut down a
nuclear power plant to the Long Island Power Authority ("LIPA"), an
agency created by the legislature.' 67 The legislation in question provided
for LIPA to supplant the previous energy supplier through the
acquisition of its assets and for LIPA to perform specific tasks as
designated in the act.' 6 8 The court held that the authority delegated to the
agency by the act was not an unconstitutional delegation because LIPA
was bound by standards set forth by the legislature.16 9 The court further
noted that LIPA was a "specialized entity" created by the legislature to
carry out specific objectives because of its expertise. 7 0
Thus, power delegated to execute law is not analogous to power
delegated to make law; only the latter delegation is unconstitutional. 7 '
163. See id at 74 (discussing the "Home Rule" provision of New York's Constitution and how
it delegates legislative power between the state and local governments).
164. See id (discussing delegation issues arising between state and local government under
New York's Constitution); see generally Greco, supra note 131 (discussing the application of the
nondelegation doctrine in the federal and state systems).
165. See Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co. v. Comm'rs of Clinton Cnty., I Ohio.
St. 77, 88-89 (1852) ("The true distinction, therefore, is, between the delegation of power to make
the law ... and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution . . .. The first [cannot] be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."); see also J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928) ("The true distinction, therefore, is, between the delegation of
power to make the law .. . and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution .... The first
[cannot] be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (quoting Cincinnati, I Ohio St. at
88-89)); Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy, Inc. v. Cuomo, 582 N.E.2d 568, 573 (N.Y. 1991)
(stating that an agency's actions in closing a nuclear facility did not interfere with a nondelegable
legislative function); Nicholas v. Kahn, 389 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (N.Y. 1979) (stating that a
legislature may delegate enforcement to an agency after it has set a proper standard).
166. 582 N.E.2d 568.
167. Id. at 570.
168. Id at 570-71.
169. Id. at 573, 575.
170. Id. at 572.
171. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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The nondelegation doctrine does not mandate that authority properly
delegated cannot be further bestowed upon a lesser administrative body
through subdelegation to carry out the law. 17 2 The question of the
constitutionality of the delegation then becomes one of degree. 17 3 Courts
understand that "the difficulty .. . of these policy determinations
mandates that the legislative body be permitted to provide for the
implementation of basic policy through the use of specialized agencies
concentrating upon one particular problem at a time."l 74 The Supreme
Court has held that policy objectives can be carried out by specialized
governmental agencies created by the legislature, but that this can only
be accomplished within the bounds of the Constitution. 17 5 Simply put, a
legislature cannot delegate its lawmaking function that has been vested
in it by a constitution. 17 6 The analysis of the constitutionality of a
legislative delegation concerns first, whether a constitution will permit
the legislature to delegate a task to another body and second, whether the
organ delegated such power has acted within bounds of the authority
granted to it. 177
Delegated power becomes ever more problematic the further it is
decentralized from the legislative body because the devolution makes it
increasingly difficult for the legislative reclamation of the dispensed
control. 7 8 Thus, the nondelegation doctrine serves the key constitutional
objective of ensuring that power be accounted for and controlled by our
elected representatives in government. 17 9 Having outlined the
nondelegation doctrine, the following section will apply the doctrine to
green building laws incorporating the LEED rating system.

172. See Suffolk Cnty. Builders Ass'n v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 389 N.E.2d 133, 136 (N.Y. 1979).
173. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Connally, 337 F. Supp.
737, 745 (D.D.C. 1971); Suffolk Cnty. Builders Ass', 389 N.E.2d at 136.
174. Nicholas v. Kahn, 389 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (N.Y. 1979).
175. See J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
176. See Mooney v. Cohen, 4 N.E.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. 1936) (citing Trs. of Saratoga Springs v.
Saratoga Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 83 N.E. 693, 699 (N.Y. 1908)) (discussing how legislatures
"cannot abdicate its constitutional powers and duties"); Theuerkauf, supra note 16, at 873 ("The
nondelegation doctrine is simply based on the idea that Congress may not delegate the legislative
power granted to it by the Constitution to administrative agencies.").
177. See Connally, 337 F. Supp. at 745-46.
178. See Amar, supranote 132, at 1378-82 (discussing how difficulty in recovering delegated
power serves as a "significantpart" of the reasoning behind the nondelegation doctrine).
179. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 337.
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B. Delegations ofLegislative Power to the USGBC Through Statutes
IncorporatingLEED
have
Legislatures, so as well as executives in certain situations,
delegated lawmaking authority to the USGBC, which is likely
unconstitutional. Legislative bodies, at the state and local levels, have
failed to recognize or even acknowledge that the USGBC is not under
government control when incorporating its LEED rating system into the
law.182 In a typical case involving a delegation of legislative power,
authority is shifted from one branch of government to another' 83 or to an
administrative entity. 184 However, this is not the case with statutes and
ordinances adopting the LEED rating system because the USGBC is a
private company not subject to government control.' 8 Problematically,
the USGBC has been implicitly delegated the power to make the law
and set the standards with which green buildings must comply.1 86 This is
problematic because the legislation that has been enacted does not
impose any reasonable safeguards or accountability on the USGBC
relating to the power that our legislative bodies have granted to it. 187
To some extent, various tiers of government have begun requiring
that new building construction and renovations conform to the LEED
green building standards. At first glance, this appears to be a positive
step for the environmental movement, as mandating compliance with
environmentally-conscious building standards will promote overall

180. See supraPart II.D (discussing legislative attempts to adopt LEED standards).
181. See, e.g., Erpenbeck & Schiman, supra note 4, at 34 (discussing how California's
governor issued an executive order mandating that new government buildings meet LEED silver
standards).
182. See About USGBC, supra note 69 (stating that the USGBC is a private "non-profit
organization"); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-38k(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010)
(requiring new government buildings to comply with LEED standards, but not acknowledging that
the USGBC is a private organization); SCOTTSDALE, ARIz. REs. No. 6644, § 2 (2005),
http://www.scottsdaleaz.gov/Assets/Public+Website/greenbuilding/Resolution+6644.pdf (same).
183. See J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 401-02 (1928) (examining a
statute delegating authority to the President of the United States).
184. See Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy, Inc. v. Cuomo, 582 N.E.2d 568, 570-71 (N.Y.
1991) (examining a statute delegating authority to an administrative agency).
185. See About USGBC, supra note 69.
186. See infra notes 192-233 and accompanying text (discussing various adoptions of LEED
standards, and how they grant the USGBC legislative power).
187. See infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
188. See Erpenbeck & Schiman, supra note 4, at 33-35 (discussing the mandating LEED
standards for new construction at different levels of state and local government); Salkin, supra note
74, at 157 ("The LEED rating systems have been very successful, and they have been incorporated
into numerous pieces of state and local legislation."); Taylor & Tollin, supra note 5, at 22 ("Several
states, counties and cities have passed legislation that requires all new public buildings in their
jurisdictions to be LEED certified." (footnote omitted)).
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environmental sustainability.1 89 However, when legislatures give the
power to set green building standards that are then incorporated in law to
a nongovernmental agency, a legislative delegation issue arises.'" 0 This
is especially true when multiple states have mandated compliance with
the LEED standards.' 9 '
The State of Washington took the lead in delegating lawmaking
power in 2005 when it became the first state to mandate that the
construction of new buildings comply with the LEED silver standard. 19 2
The Washington statute applies not only to state agency buildings, but
also to many buildings that receive state funding.19 3 The statute codifies
power granted to USGBC and allows the organization to set the green
building criteria by which the state and those receiving state funding are
legislatively mandated to abide. 19 4 In fact, the definitional section of the
Washington statute directly acknowledges that the USGBC is
responsible for the standards set forth in the LEED rating system.19 5 As
the LEED committees determine the requirements for complying with
the LEED silver standard,19 6 the Washington legislature has effectively
delegated the power to dictate the green building standards with which
the buildings covered by the statute must comply, with no discernable
principle for the USGBC to hold to when making those standards.' 97
In Connecticut, the legislature has also implicitly delegated
lawmaking authority to the USGBC by mandating compliance with a
LEED silver certification (or an equivalent standard) for state projects in
particular circumstances.198 However, the LEED standards are
189. See Green Building: Why Build Green, supra note 50 (explaining the environmental
benefits of green building).
190. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 285-87 (1908)
(examining and upholding a legislative delegation of regulatory authority to a private organization).
191. See Bronin, supra note 28, at 247-48 ("Several states, including California, Washington,
and Connecticut, have mandated that all state buildings meet LEED criteria.").
192. See Erpenbeck & Schiman, supra note 4, at 33; Eunjung Park, The U.S. Federal Green
Building Policy, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y, Fall 2007, at 71, 71 ("In 2005, the State of
Washington became the first state to adopt legislation requiring all state-funded buildings over
5,000 square feet to obtain the [LEED] silver standard. . . .").
193. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §39.35D.030(l)-(2) (West Supp. 2009) ("All major facility
projects of public agencies . . . [and all] major facility projects of any entity other than a public
agency or public school district receiving any funding in a state capital budget must be designed,
constructed, and certified to at least the LEED silver standard.").
194. See id §§ 39.35D.020(4), 39.35D.030(1)-(2).
195. See id §39.35D.020(4) ("'LEED silver standard' means the [USGBC] leadership in
energy and environmental design green building rating standard, referred to as silver standard.").
196. See LEED Committees, supranote 107.
197. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 39.35D.020(4), 39.35D.030(l)-(2).
198. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-38k(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010) (mandating that new
state authorized buildings "shall comply with or exceed compliance with the silver building rating
of the [LEED's] rating system for new commercial construction and major renovation projects, as
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flexible,1 99 and can only be altered by the committees of the USGBC,
not the legislature that has demanded compliance,200 which thereby
grants the USGBC power to make the law.
The Connecticut statute allows the USGBC to change the LEED
silver standard by not expressly prohibiting such a modification,20 1 and
requiring new construction projects to comply with whatever new
standards the USGBC promulgates. 202 The statute does not refer to a
particular version of the LEED silver standard.203 Thus, the Connecticut
legislature has unconstitutionally delegated the power to determine the
baseline criteria of-and thereby set the law for-green building
projects covered by the statute to the USGBC and its committees.204 The
statute does not merely charge the USGBC or the LEED committees
with the duty of executing the law or determining if a building complies
with the law, but instead it empowers to the USGBC to determine the
law through the evolving criteria of the LEED silver standard, which
serves as the baseline standard for projects covered under this statute. 205
Interestingly, the Connecticut legislature may have recognized and
attempted to remedy the unconstitutional delegation embodied in the
statute. The second prong of the statute requires the state to eventually
adopt its own green building criteria while using the LEED standards as
a reference. 2 0 6 Specifically, the Connecticut legislature prescribed that
government agencies must ultimately adopt their own standards based
established by the [USGBC], or an equivalent standard").
199. The LEED Committees of the USGBC develop and implement changes to the LEED
certification standards. See LEED Committees, supra note 107.
200. See Kibert & Grosskopf, supra note 103, at 150 ("LEED-NC is not based on what might
be called a scientific approach for its structure. The categories, points, and ratings are based on the
consensus of the committee that developed it."); LEED Rating System Committees, supra note I10
(explaining how LEED standards are established by USGBC committees).
201. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-38k(a) (requiring compliance with the LEED
silver standard), with LEED Rating System Committees, supra note 110 (discussing how LEED
standards are set by the USGBC committees).
202. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-38k(a).
203. The LEED committees update and revise the LEED standards on a regular basis and there
are a variety of different standards that have been promulgated as the LEED system has developed.
See LEED for Existing Buildings, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/Display
Page.aspx?CMSPagelD=221 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011); LEED for New Construction, U.S. GREEN
BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPagelD=220 (last visited Mar. 1,
2011); LEED for Schools, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.
aspx?CMSPagelD=1586 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
204. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-38k(a).
205. Compare id. (requiring new construction to conform to the LEED silver standard or its
equivalent), with St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1908)
(upholding a legislative delegation to a private organization to "designate ... the standard height of
draw bars for freight cars" subject to certification by the Interstate Commerce Commission).
206. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-38k(b).
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upon those set forth by the USGBC. 207 This could have been an attempt
by the legislature to reclaim the lost authority in the near future.
This unconstitutional statute causes a lapse in democratic
accountability to the people of Connecticut. 208 The USGBC is clearly not
an agency of the Connecticut government, nor is it under the control of
the state's executive. Instead, the USGBC is a nonprofit corporation that
has the exclusive power to make its own independent policy
determinations as to what should be included in the LEED standards. 2 0 9
The LEED silver standard can change at the whim of the LEED
committees that are empowered to alter the standards for any specific
building application that is under examination.210 This statute
exemplifies a subversion of democratic accountability that the
nondelegation doctrine was designed to check.2 11
Similarly, in New York, the legislature incorporated the LEED
rating system into its tax law, allowing buildings to receive green
building tax credits for compliance with LEED-inspired standards.2 12
While the statute does not mandate conformity with the LEED rating
system, the potential tax incentives of these LEED-inspired standards
will likely prompt adherence from developers.2 13 This statute may have
been innocuous enough by itself, but New York's green building
policies became more problematic from a constitutional standpoint when
former Governor George Pataki reinforced the policy of encouraging the
adoption of LEED standards in an executive order. 2 14 This executive
order requires state buildings to comply both with the aforementioned
provisions of the New York Tax Law and with LEED standards

207. See id (ordering various state agencies to "adopt state building construction standards that
are consistent with or exceed the silver building rating of the [LEED's] rating system").
208. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 335-36 (describing democratic accountability as a primary
value behind the nondelegation doctrine).
209. See About USGBC, supra note 69.
210. See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL BD. OF DIRS., FOUNDATIONS OF LEED app. 3 (2009),
http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentlD=6103 (stating that "[s]ubstantive changes" to
LEED content "will go into effect immediately").
211. See Theuerkauf, supra note 16, at 873-74 (describing political accountability in
decisionmaking as a key value behind the nondelegation doctrine).
212. See N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 19(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)-(7), (e)(3)(A) (McKinney 2005).
213. See Circo, supra note 124, at 71-72 ("Tax benefits, reimbursements and grants for green
building costs are the incentives that have the greatest potential to revolutionize industry practices
and [encourage] investment in green building design and construction practices .... 1").
214. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 111 (2001), http://www.nyserda.org/programs/pdfs/exorder
111 .pdf ("In the design, construction, operation and maintenance of new buildings, State agencies
and other affected entities shall, to the maximum extent practicable, follow guidelines for the
construction of 'Green Buildings,' including guidelines set forth in Tax Law § 19 ... and the
[USGBC's] LEED rating system.").
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generally to the "maximum extent practicable," 215 thereby delegating to
the USGBC the ability to set green building policy through the design of
the LEED standards. The power granted to the USGBC by the New
York statute,216 when looked at in relation to the former governor's
executive order, should be recognized as a violation of the nondelegation
doctrine due to the fact that the USGBC has not been provided with any
standards of guidance in defining LEED criteria. 2 17
Although the New York Tax Law exemplifies a less direct
delegation of legislative authority, the statute clearly refers to the
USGBC, stating "[fjor purposes of this clause, 'LEED rating system'
means the leadership in energy and environmental design green building
rating system criteria being developed by the United States green
building council." 2 18 This statute, when combined with Governor
Pataki's executive order, represents a codification of the USGBC's-and
not the people of New York's-LEED standards. 2 19 This combination of
providing tax incentives for compliance with LEED-inspired standards
and mandating compliance with LEED standards via executive order
must be called into question by the nondelegation doctrine because a
nongovernmental agency comprised of interested developers is setting
the standards that could allow them to qualify for tax incentives.22 0
Connecticut and New York are not the only states that have
unconstitutionally delegated lawmaking authority; the California
Executive, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, has also delegated
legislative authority to the USGBC through his plan to implement a
green building policy that incorporates LEED standards as a mandatory
requirement for state buildings.221 Executives in other states have taken
similar actions.222 These state level executive orders, which set green
215. Id.
216. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 19(e)(3)(A) (requiring New York agencies to adopt building
regulations "informed by the LEED rating system").
217. See id (providing no guidelines as to what LEED standards should be applied); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935) (stating that "standards of legal
obligation" must be established for any legislative delegation to be proper).
218. N.Y. TAX LAW § 19(e)(3)(A).
219. See id.; N.Y. Exec. Order No. 111, supranote 214.
220. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537 (questioning the validity of a statutory scheme that would
allow industries to act as their own regulators).
221. See Cal. Exec. Order No. S-20-04 (2004), http://www.energy.ca.gov/greenbuilding/
documents/executive order s-20-04.html (mandating that government agencies engage in energysaving methods such as "[dIesigning, constructing and operating all new and renovated state-owned
facilities paid for with state funds as 'LEED Silver' or higher certified buildings").
222. See, e.g., Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2005-05 (2005), http://www.govemor.state.az.us/eo/
2005_05.pdf ("All state-funded buildings constructed after the date of this Executive Order shall
meet at least the 'silver' [LEED] standard."); Fla. Exec. Order No. 07-126 (2007),
Department
of
("The
http://www.flclimatechange.us/ewebeditpro/items/Ol2FI5073.pdf
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building policies, 2 23 surrender a significant portion of the critical
decisions to the USGBC and its committees-who make all of the
decisions regarding the content of the LEED standardS224-by the legal
adoption of the LEED rating system.
Another example of the USGBC of the unconstitutionally delegated
authority to make law, exhibited on a more local level, is New York
City's mandate that certain construction projects satisfy LEED
standards.225 Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed off on an amendment to
the New York City Charter in 2005, which directs that buildings costing
the city $2 million or more comply with at least the LEED silver
standard.226 It cannot be said enough that the LEED silver standard
provides no principle for the USGBC to follow when setting the criteria
by which a building must comply to attain the desired rating.227
Furthermore, delegations of legislative control to a nonprofit such as the
USGBC, even at the more local levels of government-as in New York
City-are forbidden, not only by the nondelegation doctrine, but also by
the concordant "'reserved rights"' doctrine.22 8
Additionally, the Scottsdale, Arizona resolution passed by the city
council requires that all new city buildings achieve the LEED gold
rating.229 City buildings must strive for the LEED platinum rating,
except when costs prohibit the attainment of LEED's highest
standard. 23 0 The city council retains the ability to grant exceptions to
Management Services shall adopt the [USGBC's] [LEED] for New Construction (LEED-NC)
standards for all new buildings. The Department is directed to strive for Platinum Level
certification, the highest possible certification . . . .").
223. See Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2005-05, supra note 222; Cal. Exec. Order No. S-20-04, supra
supra note 214.
note 221; Fla. Exec. Order No.07-126, supranote 222; N.Y. Exec. Order No. t11,
224. See LEED Rating System Committees, supra note 110.
225. See Erpenbeck & Schiman, supra note 4, at 35 ("New York City also has passed a law for
city buildings and projects funded by the city treasury that apply to new construction, building
additions, and substantial reconstructions. These requirements include meeting LEED certification
standards and vary depending on the cost of the project.").
226. See N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW No. 86, § 2 (2005), http://www.nyc.govIhtml/dob/downloads/
pdf/ll 86of2005.pdf.
227. This is because the USGBC and its committees control the content of the LEED
standards. See LEED Rating System Committees, supra note 110.
228. Under this doctrine, a local govemment cannot "bargain away" regulatory power on
matters of public health and safety. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1879); see also Judith
Welch Wegner, Utopian Visions: Cooperation Without Conflicts in Public/Private Ventures, 31
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 313, 337 (1991) ("Under [the reserved rights] doctrine, a local government
cannot 'contract away' its police power, but must retain the right to modify regulatory requirements
as needed to respond to important public health and safety concerns.").
229. See SCOTTSDALE, ARIZ. RES. No. 6644, §2 (2005), http://www.scottsdaleaz.gov/Assets/
Public+Website/greenbuilding/Resolution+6644.pdf; Erpenbeck & Schiman, supra note 4, at 34;
Press Release, Anthony Floyd, supra note 122.
230. See SCOTTSDALE, ARIz. RES. NO. 6644, § 2.
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strict compliance under the law, but this legislative check is secondary to
the mandated compliance with the LEED rating system.23 As noted
many times before,232 the adoption of LEED standards provides no
"intelligible principle" guiding the LEED committees in setting LEED
standards, which makes this type of delegation unconstitutional as a
violation of the nondelegation doctrine.233
Unconstitutional delegations of legislative control to the USGBC
through the statutory adoption of the LEED standards have occurred
more frequently on a local level than in the statewide arena.2 34 The
localization of the delegation problem has likely occurred because of the
way in which control over land use is exercised at the local level.235
However, the level of government at which the delegations occur is
irrelevant; codification of LEED standards into law at any level of
government is an unconstitutional delegation of power to a
nongovernmental organization-the
USGBC-over which the
government and public at large can exercise no direct control.23 6
All of the aforementioned delegations of legislative power are
unconstitutional because of their violation of the nondelegation doctrine.
The laws incorporating the LEED standards fail to provide reasonable
safeguards against an abuse of the granted authority by the USGBC in
setting the LEED criteria.2 37 The lack of safeguards is not due solely to
the lack of an "intelligible principle," 238 but is also directly linked to the
231. See id. § 4 (stating that when city buildings are designed with added features and costs of
becoming a LEED gold building and the recovering of those costs will not be paid for in five years,
buildings may deviate from the standards, but must still incorporate LEED standards into their
design as much as possible); id. §5 ("The city council may grant exceptions to this Policy when it
deems appropriate.").
232. See supra notes 197, 205, 217, 227 and accompanying text (criticizing various delegations
for their lack of standards).
233. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928).
234. See Parlow, supra note 36, at 519-20 (discussing the statutory adoption of LEED
standards by state and local governments).
235. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (holding that
municipalities have the power to impose controls and restrictions on local land use); Circo, supra
note 124, at 61 (stating that municipalities use police power to implement green building policies);
Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons from RLUIPA, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 717, 727-37 (2008) (discussing the history of municipal use of zoning
regulations and judicial deference to said regulations).
236. According to the USGBC bylaws, it is the responsibility of its Board of Directors, not any
governmental body, "[t]o oversee, control and direct affairs of the [USGBC], its committees and
publications." See USGBC BYLAWS, supra note 75, at art. VI, § 2(E).
237. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1935) ("'In creating.. . an
administrative agency the legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power,
must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in the performance of
its function."' (quoting Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 59 (1922))).
238. 1 W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
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absence of control the government has over the nongovernmental
USGBC and LEED rating system.239
The USGBC is clearly not an agent of the government, but is
instead controlled by its membership.24 0 Since the USGBC is a nonprofit
corporation and lawmaking bodies have no direct control over it, the
group provides no avenue for democratic dialogue. 2 4 1 The only way that
legislatures-and thereby the people-are able to exercise any degree of
direct influence over the LEED rating system is by becoming a member
of the organization. 2 4 2 Even then, new members' influence is likely to be
negligible.24 3 Because of the lack of legislative control and
accountability the USGBC has to the citizens of this country, the LEED
standards that have been incorporated into statutes are an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
As this Part has just shown, the nondelegation doctrine is applicable
to the above laws incorporating the LEED rating system and should be
called upon by the courts to correct the unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the USGBC. The next Part will provide suggestions
to remedy the unconstitutional delegations, while allowing for the
success of the green building movement.

239. See supra note 236.
240. See About USGBC, supranote 69.
241. See id; supra note 236 and accompanying text (explaining the lack of governmental
control over the USGBC); see also Sunstein, supra note 16, at 336 (describing the "accountability"
that results from democratic dialogue as a key value behind the nondelegation doctrine).
242. Under the USGBC bylaws, federal, state, and local governments may become members of
the USGBC and its board of directors. See USGBC BYLAWS, supra note 75, at art. IlI, § 1; id. art.

VI, § 1.
243. For example, government actors occupy a miniscule percentage of positions on the
USGBC's board of directors. Only one directorship out of fifteen is currently occupied by a
government actor, and none of the six executive committee spots are occupied by a government
actor. See Board of Directors, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/Display
Page.aspx?CMSPagelD=2382& (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
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WORTHWHILE MOVEMENTS FACE SETBACKS: SUGGESTIONS AND
SOLUTIONS TO KEEP THE GREEN BUILDING MOVEMENT ALIVE

Environmentally-conscious legislation pertaining to green buildings
should continue to flourish, but who should be responsible for
implementing green building standards? The privatization 244 of
government functions has occurred in many instances and does not
always raise a constitutional question. 2 4 5 This Part sheds light on some
of the benefits of having the USGBC involved in determining green
building standards and ways in which the organization's expertise can
best be put to use. This Part also looks at ways the USGBC can remain
influential in the green building movement through pathways that other
legislative bodies have taken to avoid constitutional conflicts.
There are limited benefits to having a private entity, such as the
USGBC, developing strategies for creating a more environmentallysound built environment. One such benefit of the USGBC providing the
criteria to guide green building standards is that the organization will
bear the cost of research and development of environmentallyconscience building techniques.246 This is certainly an advantage rather
than having the cost shifted to the public sector by way of tax increases
to fund research for green building technologies. 247
Other benefits of the USGBC setting green building standards stem
from its well-developed expertise in green building design and the
organization's ability to attract individuals who are responsive to the
environmental issues that are intrinsic in our built environment's design
and construction. 248 In reality, governmental bodies may find it simply
easier and cheaper to adopt the USGBC's LEED standards rather than

244. Celeste Pagano, Proceed With Caution: Avoiding Hazards in Toll Road Privatizations, 83
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 351, 361 (2009) ("Privatization refers to any of variety of processes that transfer
government functions and responsibilities in whole or in part to the private sector."); see Savas,
supra note 21, at 889 ("'Privatization' means increased governmental reliance on the private sector,
rather than on government agencies, to satisfy the needs of society.").
245. See Mays, supra note 20, at 44.
246. LEED committees use green building experts to assess the implementation of green
technology in the LEED rating system. See LEED Technical Committee, supra note 21; see also
Savas, supra note 21, at 894-95 (discussing studies which show government officials prefer
contracting out services because of high capital costs, and that such contracted services are
generally found to be cheaper).
247. See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 12, at 20 (describing use of energy service companies to
develop energy-efficiency projects, which do not impose upfront costs upon the municipality).
248. See supra Part II.B (describing USGBC's expertise in and influence on green building
standards); see also Pagano, supra note 244, at 364 ("By privatizing a service, government can take
advantage of efficiency gains that come with private business, such as management structures,
specialized expertise, and innovation." (emphasis added)).
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spending the time, money, and effort to develop their own green

building criteria. 24 9
However, the benefits of the privatization of green building
standards must be contrasted with the substantial drawbacks of such
legislative action. 25 0 As has cleverly been stated, "[c]onsigning the
provision of [government] functions to private organizations is akin to
asking the wolf to guard the henhouse."25 1 Private Organizations,
including the USGBC, are not accountable to the people and only seek
to advance their own interests. 252 When a private organization sets green
building standards, a veil is placed over a lawmaking process that should
have encompassed public discourse and debate.253 Further, private
entities generally lack concern for the community at large. 2 54 The
privatization of environmental regulations, and specifically green
building standards, leaves the general public without an avenue to
address its specific environmental concerns. 2 5 5
It is evident that state governments have a substantial amount of
leeway in regulating the way buildings are constructed.2 56 States should
be able to determine for themselves what green building standards entail
for the specific concerns and needs of their citizenry.25 7 State and local
lawmaking bodies can use their police powers 2 58 to promulgate their
own green regulations that are based on the LEED rating system. This
approach would not violate the principles of the nondelegation
doctrine. 2 5 9 A prime example of an attempt at this approach is Portland,
Oregon, which created its own LEED rating system in conjunction with
the USGBC. 2 60 Such a combined effort puts the USGBC's green
249. See Sussman, supra note 12, at 10 ("It is considerably easier for a community to adopt an
established green building rating system than to develop its own and provide its own mechanisms
and staff to certify compliance.").
250. See Mays, supra note 20, at 68 ("[S]ince the purposes of a public and private corporation
are vastly different, the consequences of permitting private entities to perform public functions will
be perverse .... ).
251. Id. at 69.
252. See id. at 68-69.
253. See Pagano,supra note 244, at 368.
254. See Mays, supranote 20, at 69.
255. See id. at 68.
256. Circo,supra note 25, at 749.
257. See id at 774-78 (arguing for state and local implementation of green building standards).
258. James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J.L. &
HEALTH 309, 319 (1997-98) ("[S]tates maintain control over those matters which are reasonably
related to the promotion and maintenance of the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the
public, through what are traditionally known as 'police powers."' (footnote omitted)).
259. See Circo, supra note 25, at 746 ("Given the current police power jurisprudence ... few
authorities would question the legal justification for regulations that promote green buildings.").
260.

See BUREAU OF PLANNING & SUSTAINABILITY, EXHIBIT A: CITY OF PORTLAND GREEN

BUILDING POLICY 2 (2001) [hereinafter GREEN BUILDING POLICY], http://www.portlandonline.com/
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building expertise to public use, while allowing elected lawmakers to
directly shape the law and policy of green building standards
implemented in their jurisdiction.2 6 1
State and local lawmaking bodies could also give deference to the
LEED rating system, but provide an independent assessment and
interpretation of what it means to be a green building. Boulder, Colorado
is an example of such an approach.2 62 Boulder gives deference to
compliance with the LEED rating system by exempting buildings that
fulfill the requirements for the LEED silver standard from the city's own
green building criteria, the "Green Points" system.26 3 This approach
allows for the legislature to reap the benefits of the USGBC's superior
knowledge and expertise in developing standards for green building, but
still allows the legislature to have the final say in the green standards
applied to buildings in Boulder.264
Over the past few decades, states have implemented
environmentally-friendly legislation by encouraging the use of solar
panels.265 There is no reason that the same type of specific guidelines as
legislatures have instituted for solar panels cannot be set out for green
buildings. These and other corrective measures would allow for
democratic control and accountability in green building legislation while
providing an avenue for the development of an increasingly green
society. As this Part has detailed, there are paths to explore that would
allow the USGBC to remain at the forefront of designing green building
standards while retaining lawmaking power within legislative bodies and
the bounds of constitutionality.

bps/index.cfm?&a=211352&c=50447. Unfortunately, this policy was superseded by a later policy,
which took the more direct (and constitutionally problematic) approach of simply mandating
compliance with LEED standards. See BUREAU OF PLANNING

& SUSTAINABILITY,

GREEN

BUILDING RESOLUTION 2-4 (2009), http://www.portlandonline.com/bps/index.cfm?c=50447&a=24
3213.
261. See GREEN BUILDING POLICY, supra note 260. The same might have been said of similar
provisions of the Connecticut and New York statutes, if they were not secondary to the mandating
of LEED standards in their respective states. See supra notes 198-220 and accompanying text
(discussing the adoption of Connecticut and New York LEED standards).
262. See BOULDER REV. CODE. § 10-7.5-2 (2008), http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/files/PDS/
green points/902.pdf (explaining the scope and administration of Boulder, Colorado's green
building regulations).
263. See id. § 10-7.5-2(d) (allowing an exemption from the city's "Green Points" program for
buildings which are certified LEED silver or certified by a comparable green building rating
system).
264. See id § 10-7.5-2(c) (mandating compliance with all sections of the statute, and requiring
city managers to sign off on all applications).
265. See Bronin, supra note 28, at 268.
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CONCLUSION

The green movement has come a great distance since its inception
in the 1960s and the trend is likely to continue well into the future.2 66
However, the unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority to
control green building standards to the USGBC stands in direct
opposition to the principles of our democratic society.267 Although the
premise of a more environmentally-receptive built environment is
critical to our society's long-term sustainability, 26 8 we cannot depart
from the constitutional restrictions placed on our legislative bodies as
they have been interpreted by the Supreme Court and high courts of the
several states. The nondelegation doctrine imposes limitations on the
ability of legislatures to delegate their lawmaking power in order to
prevent the unconstitutional dispersal of legislative policy control to
other actors. 2 69 As this Note has shown, the delegation of lawmaking
authority through the incorporation of LEED standards in certain laws
violates the nondelegation doctrine.270
There are, however, alternatives to the unconstitutional delegations
of legislative authority when legislatures are setting green building
policy. Our legislatures, in order to promote democratic input and
accountability, must adequately explore such alternative paths, as
Portland and Boulder have done, rather than delegating their authority to
the USGBC to avoid making tough policy decisions implicit in
determining green building criteria. 27 1 Our government cannot dictate
that the green building standards imposed on our building industry
originate in a closed-off and interest-based nonprofit that has been
unconstitutionally delegated authority to determine, on a nationwide
scale, green building policy.272
The green building movement will continue to gain momentum as
the concerns about global climate change become more imminent and
the substantial environmental benefits of green building become more
widely recognized and accepted.273 The unconstitutional delegations
266. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part III.B.
268. See Sussman, supra note 12, at 8 ("The large use of energy and other resources by
buildings demonstrates the compelling need to use green building practices to foster
sustainability.").
269. See supra Part III.A.
270. See supra Part IIB.
271. See supra Part IV.
272. See supra Part III.B.
273. See Sussman, supra note 12, at 8-9 (arguing that "[g]lobal warming requires action at all
levels of society" and that green building could have a significant and beneficial impact on "climate
change mitigation").
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examined above 2 74 should encourage our governmental bodies to foster
public discourse in dealing with what seems like an insurmountable
issue with pressing implications for our nation as well as around the
globe.275 As our laws continue to reflect the trend towards a greener
society, we must not, at the expense of the democratic principles our
nation's founders enshrined in our most sacred document, allow the
fervor of the green building movement to overcome the reasoned
decisionmaking embodied in our democratic process.
FrankDavid Ditta*

274. See supra Part III.B.
275. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (explaining the significant environmental
impacts of traditional construction techniques).
* J.D. candidate, 2011; Hofstra University School of Law. I offer my most sincere thanks
and gratitude to my Note Advisor, Professor Ashira P. Ostrow, for all of her help and guidance
throughout the research and writing process. My thanks go out to Marissa Wiley for all of the
assistance she offered as my Notes & Comments Editor and to William Stoltz for all of his efforts as
my Articles Editor. Further, I would like to thank the entire Board of Editors, especially our Editorin-Chief, Danielle Nunziato, for all of the hard work it took to bring this Note to print. I must thank
Professor James E. Hickey, Jr., who has, over the course of my law school career, encouraged and
challenged me to write on topics that interest me, are timely, and of relevant importance to the legal
community. I would also like to thank my Lodge, Connetquot Lodge #838, for the unrelenting
support that the Brothers have shown me during the course of law school. Last, but most certainly
not least, I cannot thank my family enough for all of their encouragement and support. Mom, Dad,
Jennifer, Granny & Granda, Grandma & Grandpa, all of my aunts, uncles, and cousins, thank you
for everything you have done for me!

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol39/iss2/3

36

